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Abstract: This paper argues that we hold two key duties to future people: to 
leave them enough in an absolute sense, and to leave them their fair share.  Even 
if we benefit people by bringing them into existence, we can wrongly exploit our 
position to take more than our share of benefits. As in paradigm cases of 
exploitation, just because future people might agree to the ‘bargain’, this does not 
mean that they receive enough.   
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Suppose our country faces a powerful enemy, and we face a choice between building 
up our army or acquiring nuclear weapons. We decide to build the bomb. Because 
nuclear deterrence proves effective, some wars never break out, saving many lives. 
Young men who would have been drafted get jobs in missile factories or in the 
civilian sector. All this affects which people meet, with whom they mate, and the 
moment that they conceive, resulting in children genetically different from those who 
would have been born under a non-nuclear policy. These children mate with others in 
the population. Within a few generations, the genetic makeup of nearly the whole 
country is different from what it would have been without the bomb. After eight 
generations of peace, a war breaks out and kills two-thirds of the population. Every 
following generation struggles to survive in a brutish and polluted world. 
It seems we have committed a grave injustice. We bought ourselves and our 
descendants eight generations of peace at the price of a nuclear war. We may not have 
wronged the people who were living at the time of the war: They too stood to gain 
from the peace-inducing effects of nuclear deterrence, but had bad luck. You pays 
your money and you takes your chance. Every following generation, however, enters 
a damaged world.
1
 This seems unfair indeed. But wait. The post-holocaust 
generations are not the same people as would have been born had we opted for 
conventional deterrence. Other people would have been born instead. So long as they 
find their blighted lives worth living, perhaps they should even be grateful to us for 
building nuclear weapons, since it was the only chance they had to live at all!  
Philosophers will recognize this as an example of what Derek Parfit calls the 
non-identity problem. All wide-scale public policies affect who is born and who is 
not. Unless we make future people’s lives so bad as to be not worth living, we will not 
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harm them in the usual sense of making them worse off.
2
  What then is wrong with 
ravaging the environment? 
Perhaps our duty is to maximize benefits and minimize costs for future people, 
whoever those future people turn out to be. So long as the choices involve a fixed 
number of future people, utilitarianism gives plausible answers. But we are also 
deciding how many people to create, and here utilitarianism runs into trouble. If we 
should maximize total utility across generations, we might be obliged to have children 
whenever adding a child would increase overall utility. Moreover, while total 
utilitarianism would forbid us from making future people’s lives so bad as to be not 
worth living, it would not preclude making people’s lives barely worth living. The 
best world might turn out to be the Z-world of Parfit’s famous Repugnant Conclusion: 
an enormous population whose sum utility was high due merely to its numbers.
3
  
Alternatively, perhaps ravaging the environment violates future people’s 
rights. If everyone deserves certain basic resources or opportunities, this explains 
what is wrong with exposing our descendants to the consequences of nuclear war, and 
goes some way toward solving the non-identity problem.
4
 But insofar as such 
arguments focus on basic needs, they seem too undemanding. They explain why we 
should not reduce future generations to destitution, but not why it would be wrong to 
leave them much poorer than ourselves.
5
 In any case, it may seem hard to show how 
we violate their rights unless we make them worse off—and this is the very premise 
the non-identity problem calls into question.
6
 Related to this, there is the issue of the 
waiver.  We usually believe that people can waive their rights. Might not an entire 
future generation, knowing that our policies were a condition of its members’ 
existence, collectively “waive” its rights, retroactively indemnifying us from all 
blame?
7
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This article advances a solution to the non-identity problem based on 
distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal analysis by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in 
our ordinary procreative decisions we recognize three rules.
8
 First, we try to minimize 
the proportion of children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that 
all children should enjoy a minimum level of well-being, including such goods as 
enough to eat and good health. Third, we believe children should receive their fair 
share of benefits and burdens. Formulated as a population principle, this requires us, 
in lexical order, (1) to minimize the proportion of people with wretched lives; (2) to 
maximize either the proportion of people with decent lives, or the proportion who can 
enjoy decent lives; (3) to give potential people their fair share. 
This forbids actions that risk impoverishing future people, without requiring us 
to maximize utility. It thus avoids the Repugnant Conclusion.
9
 At the same time, it 
shows how we can exploit our position vis-à-vis future people by taking more than we 
deserve. We can exploit people even if we do not harm them, as the example of 
willing sweatshop workers shows.
10
 Moreover, exploitation commonly involves a 
demand for concessions in exchange for seeing that some people gain and not others. 
Those individuals come out ahead, but the group to which they belong receives less 
than its share. In such cases, we often render rights inalienable. We should do so here. 
The rights of our descendants are not ones that we would allow them to “waive.” 
I. FAILING TO PROVIDE ENOUGH 
In a famous example Parfit asks us to consider a fourteen year old girl who is 
thinking of having a baby. By having a child while she is herself so young, “she gives 
her child a bad start in life.” Our instinct is to tell the girl that having the baby would 
be wrong. Nevertheless, so long as the child’s life is worth living, it seems she does 
not harm him—indeed, for her to conceive now provides the only chance for this 
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particular child ever to live at all. We might object on the grounds that if one can 
choose between creating two individuals, one should create the happier of the two. 
Suppose, however, the 14-year-old girl learns that she will become sterile at age 15. 
Now it is a question of creating different numbers of people.
11
 If she does not have a 
baby now, she will never have one at all. No children are available for adoption, or 
ever will be. Her child’s life will be worth living. He will not be worse off as a result. 
We may still think that the girl should not have the baby.
12
 Why not? 
James Woodward’s answer is that parents owe their children duties that a 
fourteen-year-old may not be able to perform.
13
 Others formulate this as an objection 
to causing future people to have “restricted lives,” or lives that are “seriously 
defective,” even if they are still worth living. This reflects our intuition that there are 
basic needs—such as food and shelter, or adequate parenting—that all people deserve 
to have met. In Kavka’s words, “high priority should be given to providing all with 
the means to live at least a minimally decent life and engage in the major activities of 
human and community living.”14 As Lukas Meyer has argued, such an approach 
resembles the sufficiency view of distributive justice.
15
 Sufficientarians are not 
concerned with equality, but rather that everyone should have enough. This is more 
than just scraping by; a satisfactory life should “include many genuinely valuable 
elements” and “be deeply satisfying.”16 At the same time, sufficientarianism does not 
require us to have the best-off children possible. The main obligation is to do enough 
for them.
17
  
A. A SUFFICIENTARIAN POPULATION PRINCIPLE 
What population policies does the sufficiency view imply? We can agree that we 
should avoid bringing people into the world whose lives are not worth living, such as 
infants suffering from Tay-Sachs disease or the direst poverty.
18
 Nevertheless, a few 
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wretched people will inevitably be born, as well as some people whose lives, for 
reasons beyond our control, fall below sufficiency. Our goal cannot be simply to 
minimize the absolute number of people with poor lives. The most reliable way to do 
that would be to have no children at all.
19
  Maximizing the absolute number above the 
sufficiency threshold is less implausible, and goes some way toward satisfying 
utilitarian intuitions without entailing the Repugnant Conclusion. It does not require 
all people to have children, because this would place too great a burden on 
prospective parents, leading to many unsatisfactory lives.
20
 However, it does tell us to 
promote “a world overpopulated with individuals just above sufficiency, and perhaps 
containing many far below that line, over a less crowded world where everybody is 
very well off.”21  This seems hard to accept. 
Maximizing the proportion of people above sufficiency seems better, if only as 
a rough cut.
22
 We might propose the following lexical principle: 
S1: (1) Minimize the proportion of lives not worth living. (2) Maximize 
the proportion of sufficient lives. 
This requires us neither to turn the world into Mumbai nor to have no children at all. 
However, it risks being too hard on existing people. Suppose I have four children, 
Amy, Beatrix, Charlie and David. Amy and Beatrix are healthy and happy, but 
Charlie and David are severely handicapped. The proportion above sufficiency is 2/4. 
My boss gives me a big raise. I could use it to pay for expensive home care that would 
allow Charlie to lead a sufficient life, bringing the proportion to 3/4. But there is 
another option. I could use the money to have five additional children, all of whom I 
expect to be healthy and happy. This would bring the proportion to 7/9. On the 
proportion-above-sufficiency criterion, I ought to do this.  
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Most people will think I ought to help Charlie instead. So long as we are dealing 
with cases involving the same number of people, maximizing the proportion above 
sufficiency gives the right answer. But if we can create new people, this risks 
swamping our obligations to existing ones. We ought to give some kind of priority to 
those already living.
23
 At the same time, we must not deliberately create deprived 
people in order to raise existing people above the threshold. I should not, for example, 
have another child so as to put her to work in a sweatshop to pay for Charlie’s 
treatment. We might propose, again in lexical order, 
S2: (1) Minimize the proportion of all lives not worth living. (2) Bring 
existing lives above sufficiency in preference to adding new ones. (3) 
Maximize the proportion of new lives that are sufficient. 
S2 protects my existing children without exploiting new ones. But it would 
sharply limit the number of new people below the sufficiency threshold. Is this too 
demanding? Let’s return to the fourteen-year-old girl. We may agree that the girl 
should wait if she can later have a different child whose life will be sufficient.  But if 
she cannot, opposing the mere addition of a person whose life is still worth living may 
seem perverse.
24
 Similarly, we may think it is bad that wretched people, such as the 
victims of the Ethiopian famine, ever live. We may also believe that if new people can 
be brought into existence above a sufficiency threshold, then this is what we should 
do. But if it is not possible to bring all the latter above the threshold, it may not seem 
bad that they ever live. To create people whose lives are worth living does not harm 
them in the usual sense. We might then favor 
S3: (1) Minimize the proportion of all lives not worth living. (2) Bring 
existing lives above sufficiency in preference to adding new ones. (3) Of 
new lives that can be sufficient, maximize the proportion that are so.  
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S3 would not preclude the mere addition of people with restricted lives. Yet it 
too evades the Repugnant Conclusion. Let us set the Sufficiency threshold just below 
Cuba, and the Misery threshold just above the Ethiopian Famine (the choice of 
countries is notional and should not be taken too seriously): 
Sweden 
 
USA 
 
Cuba__________________________________________________ SUFFICIENCY 
 
Nicaragua 
 
Bangladesh 
_______________________________________________________MISERY 
Ethiopian Famine 
FIGURE 1: SUFFICIENCY AND MISERY 
We should not want Ethiopians to be born below the Misery threshold. But we may 
believe that it is not bad for Bangladeshis to be born below the Sufficiency 
threshold.
25
 If so, it is good for Swedes or Americans, who are well above the 
threshold, to help them. But it would be wrong to expect Cubans to do the same. This 
ensures that we will not end up, through continual growth and redistribution, as one 
big Bangladesh.  
This is what Parfit calls an “Elitist version of the Lexical View.” He worries that 
such views could lead us to reject redistribution from impoverished Europeans to 
malnourished Africans.
26
 Maximizing the proportion above sufficiency would indeed 
fall short in fulfilling our duties to existing people because, in its preoccupation with 
bringing people above the threshold, it would be insensitive to the needs of those far 
below.
27
 But as a population principle it works better.
28
 We should not deny food to 
starving people. If Africans are starving, it might be good for Cubans and poorer 
Europeans to help them. But we can reasonably think it bad that starving people are 
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ever born. While it may not be bad for impoverished Bangladeshis to be born, Cubans 
would not be obliged to aid them if it left the latter themselves deprived.
29
 We may, 
however, consider it unfair that some should live just above the sufficiency line and 
others well below it. If so, then this is a reason to adopt S2 rather than S3, minimizing 
the proportion of people who fall below sufficiency.   
So far I have assumed we are certain about the outcomes of our actions. Often 
we face choices where our choices might bring people below the threshold. Runaway 
climate change, for example, could impoverish future generations, but aggressive 
measures to curb carbon emissions could slow economic growth, also miring many 
people in poverty.
30
 Confronted with tradeoffs between risks, it makes sense to 
maximize the expected proportion above sufficiency, multiplying the numbers 
affected by the estimated chance of their falling below the threshold.
31
 This speaks in 
favor of ambitious carbon mitigation. Over the next century or two we are likely to 
overcome most absolute material poverty—barring catastrophe.32 Even drastic curbs 
on carbon emissions by the industrialized countries seem unlikely to stop growth.
33
 
Nor would the levelling off of material production mean an end to human progress, 
including the reduction of poverty.
34
 Runaway climate change, in contrast, could 
bring many or even all future generations below sufficiency. Given the huge number 
of future people, even a small chance of climatic disaster must outweigh even a high 
likelihood of slower growth over the next few decades. 
B. SUFFICIENCY IS INCOMPLETE 
The real shortcoming of the sufficiency approach is that it fails to explain how, 
without making people’s lives “restricted” or “seriously defective,” we can still act 
wrongly. Even critics of demanding theories of intergenerational justice may concede 
that it could “be unfair of any generation to take advantage of the fact that it happened 
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to arrive earlier in time in order to use up supplies of critical natural capital to the 
point that future generations would be reduced to dire poverty.”35 Yet this offers no 
objection to actions that leave future people above sufficiency. Take Kavka’s example 
of a pill that, when taken before intercourse, heightens sexual pleasure, but causes a 
mild birth defect—say, a missing thumb. The particular child who results has not been 
made worse off, because pausing to swallow the pill affects his genetic makeup.
36
 Nor 
is life without a thumb seriously defective or restricted. The objection is that the 
outcome for future people should have been better, not that it is absolutely bad.
37
 
Sufficiency must come before equity. As Raino Malnes observes, “Unmet vital 
needs are a greater evil than unfairness.”38 Yet that does not mean that sufficiency 
exhausts our obligations in non-identity cases.
39
 We need a theory that allows us 
criticize choices like taking the pleasure pill. Where shall we look for it?  
II. TAKING MORE THAN OUR SHARE 
Kavka provides a clue. He tells the story of a couple who agree to produce a 
child and sell him into slavery. The contract binds the couple so that there is no way—
legal or illegal—that they can free the child. His life, while hard, will still be worth 
living. Indeed, if the parents could somehow bargain with the prospective child in 
advance, he might consent to the decision, “waiving” his right to freedom in exchange 
for being born. Nevertheless, the couple’s action seems wrong. Why? Kavka gives 
two answers. First, the slave boy’s life will fall below the minimum level of quality 
that everyone’s life ought to attain—we might say sufficiency. But a second reason is 
that the parents are “exploit[ing] their unearned position of control over life for others 
to, in a sense, ‘extort’ an unfair price for the exercise of those powers.”40 While the 
slave boy might “waive” his right to freedom in exchange for the opportunity to exist, 
this is not a fair bargain for the couple to make. 
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Part of Kavka’s objection is that it uses the slave child as the means to an 
end.
41
 It is this Kantian dimension on which Parfit focused in a 1982 critique. Parfit 
concluded that the argument offers no objection to resource depletion or burying 
nuclear waste, since in such cases we are not using future people at all.
42
 But Kavka 
also objects to the bargain because it is unfair. It is like discovering water during a 
drought and selling it at extortionate prices. Such actions “strike us as wrong because 
[they] extor[t] an excessive (and unearned) price...[for] the benefit of existence....The 
fact that such agreement would have been forthcoming under such coercive 
circumstances does not imply that the agreement is a fair one.”43 The couple has 
misappropriated a benefit from their child—whoever he turns out to be—creating an 
inequity. They have exploited him. 
A. A TYPOLOGY OF INTERGENERATIONAL (IN)JUSTICE 
A widely accepted definition of exploitation is that of taking unfair 
advantage—often of the victim’s weakness, desperation or ignorance. Failing to show 
respect for persons and taking more than one deserves are two ways cited of doing 
this.
44
 Having the slave child is exploitative in both ways. On the one hand, he is 
treated as a means to an end. But the couple also deprives the boy of his birthright of 
freedom in order to enrich themselves. Exploitation can occur even when the exploited 
party benefits from, and would voluntarily consent to, the transaction. She may gain 
more than her exploiter. A doctor who overcharges for a life-saving operation, as Alan 
Wertheimer notes, exploits the patient even though the latter benefits more. The 
exploited party receives less than she deserves according to the relevant “fairness 
baseline.” An action that does not harm a party can still exploit her.45  
Likewise, the mother who takes the pleasure pill takes more than her share 
from the relationship. A child without a thumb need not suffer a restricted or defective 
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life. Rather, by demanding he “waive” his right to his finger, the mother exacts an 
extortionate price. The same considerations apply in Parfit’s example of Paula and 
Petra, both of whom know they will bear a handicapped child. Paula can avoid the 
handicap by delaying conception; Petra’s child will be handicapped whenever she 
conceives.
46
 Let us assume the handicap is not a serious one. For Paula to have her 
child now seems wrong, whereas we are unlikely to condemn Petra. Why? Petra 
neither produces a child with an insufficient life nor takes unfair advantage. In 
contrast, by putting her own convenience (or whim) before the health of her child, 
Paula takes something that she ought not to take. She misappropriates a benefit.
47
 
When we bring people below the minimum and take more than we deserve, 
our actions are especially bad. James Woodward asks us to imagine a chemical plant 
owned by Acme Corporation which cannot be operated profitably unless it disposes of 
pollutants in a dangerous fashion. Two people meet each other at the plant and 
conceive a child. The boy develops cancer as a result of the pollutants.  His life is still 
worth living, and without the pollutants, this boy would never have been born.
48
 
Nevertheless, Acme’s action was egregiously wrong. Why? One answer is that cancer 
deprives children of the sort of childhood that we believe every child ought to have.
49
 
But another is that Acme profited by causing a case of cancer. Its action is worse than 
that of Parfit’s fourteen-year-old girl. Both actions result in a child whose condition 
falls below the minimum standard. Nevertheless, the girl’s choice seems as much 
unfortunate as actually wrong. While sharp words might pass when we learn of her 
pregnancy, our chief response ought to be compassion and assistance. In contrast, we 
will throw the book at Acme Corporation. In large part this is because Acme’s action 
was selfish. Suppose that, after having the baby, the fourteen-year-old girl steals and 
squanders a poor family’s savings, thus depriving their future child of a good start in 
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life. Again, the theft will be likely to determine that child’s identity, but this time we 
will judge her action much more harshly. Like Acme, she will not only have caused a 
child to lack a good start in life, but also have taken more than her share. 
When parents neither risk neglecting their children nor take unfair advantage, 
we generally approve of their decision to conceive. Consider the case, adapted from 
Doran Smolkin, of a poor couple who decide to have a baby.
50
 The couple earns 
enough to provide the child with all the basic necessities, but she will have to work 
from the age of fourteen to support the family, and will not enjoy all the pleasures and 
advantages that a middle class couple could provide. Indeed, her overall welfare may 
fall below of that of the child without a thumb. Nevertheless, the couple’s decision is 
unobjectionable. Imagine that the couple provided their daughter with the same 
minimum conditions as before, but used her earnings to buy themselves luxuries. Now 
we would condemn them, because they would be exploiting her. 
 Equity Inequity 
Below Sufficiency 14-Year-Old Girl Slave-Child Couple 
Acme Company  
Above Sufficiency Petra 
Poor Couple 
Pleasure Pill 
Paula  
 
FIGURE 2: TYPES OF INTERGENERATIONAL (IN)JUSTICE 
Thinking of the slave child as a case of exploitation casts light on a puzzle: If 
even a slave’s life is worth living, why would we condemn the couple for bearing a 
child to sell him into slavery, but not for remaining childless?
51
 Parfit’s answer is that 
while it would be permissible not to have a child, if they do choose to have a child, 
they ought to have a free one. Similarly, Parfit continues, one may legitimately refuse 
to save a stranger’s arms at great cost to oneself, but if one does decide to do so, it 
would be wrong to save one arm when one could as easily save both.
52
 This is true 
even if the stranger prefers having one of his arms saved to neither. Compare Alan 
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Wertheimer’s distinction between just and exploitative marriages. We do not believe 
people are obliged to marry. But if they do marry, we think that they ought to share 
the burdens of marriage. It is not enough to say that a spouse who is forced to assume 
more than her share of the housework has not been harmed because she prefers even 
an exploitative marriage to no marriage at all.
53
  
Why? Wertheimer’s answer is that a decision to marry shifts the moral 
standard. Cooperation often creates a “social surplus”—gains to be divided among the 
parties. “Any transaction or relationship that creates a social surplus gives rise to a 
new moral feature—fairness or unfairness—that does not arise outside of that 
transaction or relationship.”54 According to what is now a widely accepted “fairness 
baseline,” spouses should share the housework. The same consideration arises in the 
case of the slave child. Couples have no obligation to create the social surplus of a 
human life. But if they do, they must not appropriate an unfair share. The decision to 
save the stranger’s arms also creates a new moral feature. But in this case, the 
criterion by which we measure the rescuer’s decision is not fairness, but beneficence. 
As Parfit says, it would be “grossly perverse” to refuse to maximize the social surplus 
at no cost, and to save only one arm when one could save two.
55
  
B. FUTURE PEOPLE’S FAIR SHARE 
We have seen that we should, in lexical order of priority, (1) minimize the 
proportion of all lives not worth living; (2) bring existing lives above sufficiency in 
preference to adding new ones; (3) maximize either the proportion of new lives above 
sufficiency, or the proportion of new lives that can be lived above sufficiency. The 
parents of the Slave Child act consistently with (1) and (2). But by choosing to have a 
slave child rather than a free one, they violate (3). Moreover, they profit from doing 
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so. To profit by deliberately violating an obligation is to take unfair advantage. They 
have exploited him. 
Bringing future people below sufficiency is not the only way we can take unfair 
advantage. We can also take more than our share. How do we know what our fair 
share is? Alan Wertheimer suggests that a rough cut is provided by the market price. 
“The competitive market price,” he observes, 
is a price at which neither party takes special unfair advantage of particular 
defects in the other party's decision-making capacity or special 
vulnerabilities in the other party's situation. It is a price at which the 
specific parties to this particular transaction do not receive greater value 
than they would receive if they did not encounter each other. It may or 
may not be a "just price," all things considered, but it may well be a 
nonexploitative price, for neither party takes unfair advantage of the other 
party.
56
 
 
Demanding something as a quid pro quo that is normally given away for free can be a 
form of exploitation. We will look askance at a rescuer who demands $10,000, as 
Wertheimer notes, because our baseline is that rescuers should not expect large 
rewards.
57
  If the rescue is dangerous or costly, we might understand such a demand, 
but certainly not if all it involves is throwing a rope from the river bank. 
For Acme Corporation to demand a “waiver” as the price of being born a 
particular person is to demand something for which there is no market price. “Agree 
to let us poison you,” Acme says to the boy, “or we’ll see that your parents give birth 
to someone else instead.” There is no market rate for causing some people to exist and 
not others. It costs us nothing, and we do it all the time for free. You are not indebted 
to me if I delay your mother for five minutes in the supermarket, with the result that 
the same evening she conceives you and not someone else.
58
 To insist on recompense 
is like insisting on being paid for throwing in the rope. Moreover, such “bargains” do 
not even produce a social surplus. Acme’s contribution is purely parasitic, like a 
trustee who transfers an inheritance to one heir rather than to another because the 
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former offers him a cut of the proceeds. Both the trustee and the heir benefit from the 
deal, but only because the deal determines the heir’s identity.  
The parents of the Slave Child and the mother who takes the pleasure pill, in 
contrast, are deciding whether to create a person at all. They do this at some cost to 
themselves, and in creating a new life, they create a social surplus. They may 
legitimately expect something in return. The problem is that they demand too much. 
“For the couple to both sell their prospective child into slavery and justify this act on 
the grounds that the child benefits,” Kavka observes, 
may be viewed as similar to an act of indirect extortion. To offer such a 
justification is tantamount to saying, "This is a bargain that the child or 
its guardian would have agreed to, hence there is nothing wrong with the 
corresponding act."…. [Yet] human existence, and the power to create it, 
[are not] commodities that may be sold for whatever the market will 
bear.
59
 
 
In fact, the parents are exploiting a monopoly to sell above the market rate.
60
 They 
have a choice of “customers”—if this child doesn’t agree to their terms, they can 
always “sell” to a different one. The child, on the other hand, can only be born if he 
accepts these parents’ offer.61 Suppose we could put the bargaining on a more even 
footing. Parents could “sell” to any child who accepted their terms, but children could 
also “buy” from any prospective parents who made an offer. The child would easily 
find parents who did not insist on selling him into slavery or popping the pleasure pill. 
 Would he? There are an infinite number of potential children. Wouldn’t they 
compete with each other, with some offering up their freedom or their fingers in 
exchange for being born? Most parents do not want to take their children’s fingers. 
Part of their share of the social surplus from childrearing is seeing their offspring 
enjoy the use of all ten digits. The market price for children is not the same as that for 
sweatshop labor. Indeed, some would see bargaining with one’s children as if they 
were workers to be milked for the best possible terms as exploitation in itself.
62
 Mr. 
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Murdstone may do hard by his employees, but by Wertheimer’s criteria he is not 
taking special advantage of them.
63
 By putting his own stepson to work sorting 
bottles, in contrast, Murdstone exploits David Copperfield by middle class Victorian 
standards. He offers David less of the social surplus from the parent-child relationship 
than he could obtain on “the market,” as David discovers when Betsey Trotwood 
adopts him. 
Defining exploitation as taking special unfair advantage does risk suggesting 
that any widespread practice—such as running sweatshops—cannot be exploitative.  
As Ruth Sample points out, it permits criticism of abnormal transactions, but not 
criticism of the norms themselves. The “market rate” for marriage is an unequal share 
of domestic housework, even in societies where women also hold full-time jobs. That 
this is what most men “offer” their prospective brides does not mean the bargain is 
fair.
64
 On at least some Marxist views, capitalist labor markets are exploitative 
because the owners’ control of the means of production enables them to expropriate 
an unfair share of the social surplus from cooperation.
65
 Analogously, what if control 
of the means of reproduction allows parents to extort more than their share of the 
social surplus from having children? We should not assume that practices are fair 
because they are pervasive.  
Nevertheless, most people have the chance to be both children and parents. 
Childrearing is thus less likely to entail net unfairness over a lifetime.
66
 Moreover, it 
is widely assumed that parents should divide the social surplus unevenly—to 
children’s advantage. Just as the former received the larger share from their parents, 
so too they should give the lion’s share to their children. The market rate seems more 
likely to be fair to children than it does to workers or women. 
C. CAN WE EXPLOIT THE PEOPLE OF THE DISTANT FUTURE? 
17 
 
We can exploit our children. Can we exploit our distant descendants? If we 
define exploitation merely as taking unfair advantage, then certainly we can. “[T]here 
are cases,” asserts Wertheimer, “in which the exploitee may be entirely passive. A 
may sell photographs of B without B's knowledge, or rob a purse from a sleeping B or 
follow B's taillights in a dense fog.”67 Defined in this broad sense, exploitation could 
involve appropriating an unfair share of benefits, or externalizing an unfair share of 
costs.
68
 But usually exploitation connotes using people. For the most part, we cannot 
do this to our distant descendants. As Christopher Bertram points out, many of the 
ways that we benefit at future people’s expense, such as despoiling the environment, 
do not involve using them at all. Bertram argues that it is still possible to exploit 
distant future generations. Just as within a group of contemporaries, shirkers exploit 
their counterparts, so too in a long-term intergenerational enterprise, such as a family 
firm, one generation can exploit another. “It seems odd and arbitrary,” he observes, 
“to allow the fact that activities take place non-contemporaneously to affect that 
judgment.”69 Yet when one worker shirks her duties, she takes more than her share of 
the proceeds from cooperation. In contrast, we do not generally cooperate with our 
distant descendants.
70
 The exception—and it is an important one—is debt. When 
governments borrow to undertake public works, they do so on the understanding that 
future taxpayers will do their part by paying off the loan. If the borrowing serves the 
purpose of productive investment, it creates a social surplus which can benefit both 
generations.
71
 But this is an exceptional case. 
Rather than exploiting our distant descendants, it may be more exact to say 
that we exploit our position at their expense. Justice entails more than a fair division 
of a social surplus. It also means the fair distribution of inherited goods. We cheat 
distant generations when we deprive them of their just inheritance. How we determine 
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what that just inheritance should be depends in turn on our theory of distributive 
justice. An entitlement theory such as Nozick’s will give a different account than a 
contractarian theory such as Rawls’s.72 Egalitarian theories of various stripes give yet 
other answers.
73
 As Robert Mayer observes, “Because a claim that exploitation has 
occurred depends on an assumption about what fairness requires, there will inevitably 
be different theories of exploitation.”74 What is important here is that we can abuse 
our position in time to take unfair advantage not only of our children, but also of our 
distant descendants.
75
 Demanding a cut of their inheritance in exchange for ensuring 
that they are born is like taking a bribe to give a legacy to one party and not another. 
III. THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF FUTURE PEOPLE 
 When a trustee takes a bribe, she makes people who would have received the 
inheritance worse off. In non-identity cases, we do not harm anyone in this sense. 
Even when it is theoretically possible that exactly the same individuals would have 
been born had we acted differently, the odds against it are astronomical.
76
 Some have 
suggested that if their lives are worth living, they would waive any rights they have 
against our actions, even if their lives were brought below the sufficiency threshold. 
“[I]t is arguable,” Jeff McMahan suggests, “that conceiving a person with a life below 
the minimum but above zero would not constitute a violation of his rights at all. For, 
if the person is later glad that he was conceived, this might be regarded as tantamount 
to his retroactively waiving his right.”77 
Jeffrey Reiman has recently argued that the waiver argument misconstrues the 
interests of our descendants. He proposes that we imagine an original position of all 
people who are alive today and all people who will live in the future. These people 
would have an interest in being born with certain properties—such as health or 
wealth—but not in being born as any particular person independent of these 
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properties. They would “insist that it is unjust to make the price of some particular 
individual's existing that that person waive his or her right not to be negatively 
affected.”78 Reiman’s argument is an ingenious one that understates its own 
implications. Not only would the people consider it unjust to demand that they accept 
a birth defect—it would also be an empty threat. “Give me your finger,” says the 
mother, “or I’ll decide to have you later.” “So what?” says the future child. “I’ll just 
be born as another particular person.” Since he would have no interest in becoming 
one particular person and not another, he could laugh in the blackmailer’s face.79  
 Nevertheless, let us suppose the child does have a stake in being born as that 
particular person, or with that specific bundle of properties. His mother has still 
exploited him. We can best see this through an analogy. Imagine, to borrow Arthur 
Kuflik’s example,80 that we face a housing shortage, with more prospective tenants 
than apartments to go around. If tenants are allowed to waive their right to a 
minimally habitable apartment, we are apt to see a race to the bottom. Some would-be 
renters will sign away their rights in exchange for being offered a fleapit. If the 
housing shortage is extreme—say, 10 apartments for 1000 applicants—waivers might 
result in an entirely different population of tenants. If so, no identifiable tenant will be 
worse off. Indeed, each tenant may be glad she could waive her rights, because it 
meant she was chosen and not someone else. Yet if we allow waivers, landlords do 
better than they deserve, and tenants as a class do worse. Analogously, if we exploit 
our temporal position, future people may gain as individuals, but as a class they will 
receive less than their share. 
When people are threatened by exploitation, we often render their rights 
inalienable. Such rights protect vulnerable people as groups. While the minimum 
wage protects workers as a class, it may actually exclude less diligent or capable 
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workers from the labor market by forbidding them to sell their labor on the cheap.
81
 In 
such cases, Russell Hardin observes, 
the members of a relevant class are potentially pitted against each other 
to their collective harm, and the only way to secure them against that 
collective harm is to deny them singly the right to free ride on the 
abstinence of other members of the class. If one holds...that a right is for 
the benefit of the right holder, one might find it odd that, when it is ever 
invoked, it is actually invoked to stop the right holder from acting in a 
particular way....The notion of an inalienable right is somehow 
contradictory if it is seen as an individual right. It makes sense only at 
the group level because whatever benefit comes to an individual under 
the right comes indirectly through its effects on the relevant larger 
class.
82
 
 
By forbidding tenants from waiving their rights, we prevent landlords from exploiting 
them. Suppose that potential people were willing to waive their rights in order to 
become the earth’s tenants. We would rightly forbid them from doing so.   
One might object, “Yours is a false analogy. If some tenants snap up apartments 
below code, other people are denied them. The latter are merely possible tenants, but 
real people. These people are harmed. If we impoverish future generations, the 
possible people will never exist at all.” Do we object merely on behalf of the “other 
people”? Consider Joel Feinberg’s example of a pair of scalpers who buy tickets to a 
baseball game for which demand exceeds supply. Feinberg has trouble seeing whom 
their action wrongs. Not the team’s owners, who get the price they demanded. Not the 
buyers either. If not for the scalpers, other people would have gotten the tickets. The 
buyers are delighted to pay through the nose. Feinberg concedes that other fans might 
have a grievance, but holds that “it would be very difficult consistently to exclude 
willingness to pay as a relevant qualification in other contexts.”83 Suppose that we 
agree. Can we not object to scalping?  
I believe we can. Market transactions normally entail a social surplus. Sellers 
sell for more than the minimum they would be willing to accept, and buyers pay less 
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than the maximum they are prepared to give. Rightly or wrongly, it is widely assumed 
that buyers deserve a share of this benefit. Here, however, the scalpers have “stolen” 
part of the buyers’ consumer surplus and thus exploited the buyers. In so doing they 
have also determined who the buyers are. Scalpers do better than they should and 
buyers as a class fare worse, even though these particular buyers do better. Similarly, 
particular future people in non-identity cases fare better, but future people as a class 
do worse than they deserve. The actions are impersonally unjust. 
IV. SUFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND EXPLOITATION 
  Many writers on population ethics believe a solution to the non-identity 
problem should be an impersonal one. Such a belief makes sense: why should it 
matter which child is enslaved or loses her finger? Many also assume this theory 
must be utilitarian. This seems to me a mistake. In our everyday reproductive 
decisions, we do not consider ourselves obliged to maximize utility. Rather, we seek 
to ensure, above all, that our children receive enough. Maximizing total utility leads 
toward the Repugnant Conclusion, and has other unacceptable implications. 
Notably, the sheer number of future people could require us to make enormous 
sacrifices in the present for the sake of trivial gains for our descendants, as critics of 
the 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change charged.
84
 The usual 
solution is to “discount” gains to future people, but this is both ad hoc and 
misleading.
85
  
 We can avoid these problems by maximizing sufficiency. Seeking a decent 
existence for the largest possible share of persons—whether present or future—
provides for our descendants without making impossibly high demands on the 
present.
86
 Nor does it require us to maximize population. Indeed, if wild animals 
have moral standing, it requires us to limit our numbers so as not to deprive them of 
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the conditions they require for decent lives.
87
 Sufficiency must come before equity, 
and given how far we are from ensuring even the former for future people, it might 
seem that equity is icing on the cake.
88
 All the same, we should not forget that we 
owe our descendants not only enough; we also owe them their fair share. We can 
take unfair advantage of future people as a class, even if individual future people 
benefit. The non-identity problem is no obstacle to condemning this. 
Yet there are strong incentives for the present generation to take more than its 
share, and good reasons to believe that this is occurring.
89
 While future generations 
may turn out to be richer than we are, global warming or no global warming, it is also 
possible that climate change will bring them below sufficiency. To expose such a vast 
number of people to even a small risk of catastrophe is reckless. We have no excuse 
for discounting future people’s interest in a sufficient life.90 Our duty to maximize 
expected sufficiency combined with the long shadow of the future means that we must 
avoid the smallest risk of permanent disaster. It offers a new basis for Hans Jonas’ 
injunction to “gran[t] priority to well-grounded possibilities of disaster (different from 
mere fearful fantasies) over hopes, even if no less well grounded.”91 
Recognizing that shifting costs and risks to the future is exploitative allows us 
to situate intergenerational justice in a broader body of progressive and radical 
theory.
92
 Yet it also reveals the peculiar obstacles that efforts to overcome these 
abuses confront. Future people cannot organize, or impose significant costs on their 
oppressors. Unlike exploited humans living today, they are almost entirely dependent 
on our goodwill.
93
 If people respond to moral suasion, or can be brought to identify 
with future people, exposing the exploitative nature of our existing practices may help 
to change them.
94
 If not, then the outlook could be bleak for future generations. 
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